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Abstract
The Russia-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out a
broad information campaign in the U.S. before and after the 2016
presidential election. The organization created an expansive set
of internet properties: web domains, Facebook pages, and Twitter
bots, which received traffic via purchased Facebook ads, tweets,
and search engines indexing their domains. We investigate the
scope of IRA activities in 2017, joining data from Facebook
and Twitter with logs from the Internet Explorer 11 and Edge
browsers and the Bing.com search engine. The studies demon-
strate both the ease with which malicious actors can harness so-
cial media and search engines for propaganda campaigns, and the
ability to track and understand such activities by fusing content
and activity resources from multiple internet services. We show
how cross-platform analyses can provide an unprecedented lens
on attempts to manipulate opinions and elections in democracies.
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) has been identified as
a Russia-based company focused on media and information
propagation (Intelligence Community Assessment 2017). The
organization was found to have spent at least 5.8 million
rubles, or sixty-eight thousand USD, from June 8, 2015
to July 1, 2017, on disseminating information to the U.S.
public via Facebook advertising. They fielded thousands
of Facebook advertisements and sent millions of Tweets,
promoting hundreds of web domains and Facebook groups
that spanned the political spectrum (Schiff 2018a; 2018b;
Darren L. Linvill 2018). According to an indictment made
against IRA by the U.S. Special Counsel’s Office on February
16, 2018, the purpose of IRA’s expenditures of effort and capital
was to “sow discord in the U.S. political system, including the
2016 U.S. presidential election” (Robert S. Mueller 2018).
In the process of investigating Russian election interference,
the U.S. House Intelligence Committee released IRA-linked
Facebook advertisements and Twitter accounts into the public
domain (Schiff 2018a; 2018b). As stated in the release:
Russia exploited real vulnerabilities that exist across
online platforms and we must identify, expose, and defend
ourselves against similar covert influence operations in
the future.
We have pursued an understanding of how IRA’s campaign
targeted these “vulnerabilities,” in the hopes of contributing to
an awareness of how malicious actors can exploit large-scale
commercial internet services.Wemerge Facebook and Twitter
datasets with logs from Microsoft’s web browsers and Bing
search engine, thus fusing data from three major internet
∗Research performed during an internship at Microsoft Research.
Figure 1: IRA campaign structure. Illustration of the structure
of IRA sponsored content on the web. Content spread via
a combination of paid promotions (Facebook ads), unpaid
promotions (tweets and Facebook posts), and search referrals
(organic search and recommendations). These pathways pointed
to a combination of pages, some of which were created by the
IRA (e.g. blackmattersus.com). IRA properties often
contained engagement levers designed to maintain contact with
users and push them towards events pages and donation pages.
companies to provide a broader lens on the overall scope and
influence of the IRA generated content (Fig. 1).
We find that IRA-generated content spanned the political
spectrum and covered a combination of apolitical, informative,
local news and inflammatory articles on politically sensitive
subjects. During the time frame of our studies, we found that
the IRA invested more resources on Facebook in promoting
left-leaning content than on right-leaning content. Right-leaning
Twitter handles received more traffic than left-leaning handles
on Twitter. We describe two case studies that show that the
apolitical content and local news related IRA-properties reached
users through search, and played a role in bringing traffic to
IRA domains. We examine the IRA Facebook ad keyword
targeting strategy and we investigate correlations between the
regions where the ads received clicks, and the demographics
of those regions.
Our specific findings are as follows:
1. IRA Content: The IRA produced and amplified a diverse
array of left-leaning, right-leaning and apolitical content. We
show two examples of Facebook advertisements in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2: Two example Facebook ads run by the IRA in 2017,
out of 1,400 ads run post-election. The top ad is for the group
“PatriotUs”, while the bottom is for the group “Pan-African
roots”.
The advertisements and tweets ranged from emotionally
charged to neutral (Fig. 3). IRA content drew traffic
mainly from social media and search domains. While some
IRA-established properties amplified politically sensitive
topics (e.g. the Facebook group StopAllInvaders) others
shared apolitical content1. One web property encouraged
users to attend events, subscribe to mailing lists, and donate
(see Tables 1, 4, Sections III, IV).
2. IRA Strategies: Through a study of traffic to the IRA
properties we are able to make educated guesses about
strategies that the IRA might have employed. For instance,
we find that while there were similar amounts of left and
right-leaning tweets on Twitter, the right-leaning tweets
received more traffic in our datatset (Fig. 3). On the other
hand, the IRA produced more left-leaning content on
Facebook. Furthermore, they spent more money promoting
left-leaning ads than right-leaning ads on Facebook.
We use a basic model to estimate the effect of the paid
promotions on traffic spikes. Under certain assumptions
and for our basic model we find the paid promotions likely
increased traffic spikes to the left-leaning properties (Fig. 8).
We identify a strategy of employing apolitical content to gar-
ner credibility and engagement; such content received traffic
via Bing onMicrosoft promotional channels. One IRA article
about Black Female Computer Scientists2 appeared among
1For example: ”Black Female Computer Scientists. How Many
Do You Know?” published at https://blackmattersus.com/31081-black-
female-computer-scientists-how-many-do-you-know/
2https://blackmattersus.com/31081-black-female-computer-
scientists-how-many-do-you-know/
the search results returned for a query that was promoted
across Microsoft device lock-screens (Fig. 7 and Section V).
Finally, we present a case study on a tactic employed on
Twitter: rapid tweeting about evolving local news stories
(Fig. 5). We believe a goal may have been to capture clicks
before local news outlets were able to cover the story.
3. IRA Outcome/Effects: Despite the large volume of content
generated by the IRA, on average only roughly 1 in 40,000
internet users in our dataset clicked on an IRA-property
(Tweet, Facebook Group, URL) on a given day. Furthermore,
we found only low volumes of traffic to meetup pages,
donation pages and contact forms on the IRA domains (Table
4). Likewise, we found low correlation between geographic
areas of heavy traffic to IRA domains and U.S. protests in
2017. We found no significant changes in traffic to news
websites and to extreme news websites or to political dona-
tion websites (within a single browsing session, after a user
was exposed to IRA content). This warrants further research
that could take into account what we could not observe, such
as traffic before and during the election, broader traffic from
multiple browsers and search engines, traffic from mobile
applications, long-term user behavioral change, real-world
actions and posts made after exposure (see Section VI).
The remainder of the work is structured as follows: We begin
by describing our datasets and methodology (Section II). We
then describe the high-level structure of the IRA web properties
and promotions (Section III), and follow by discussing the
themes and messages that were ultimately promoted and clicked
on (Section IV). We discuss the impact of paid promotions on
Facebook as well as the role played by search through some
case studies (Section V). Finally we discuss the implications
and limitations of this research, and contextualize it with prior
research in this space.
II. Data andMethodology
We have harnessed data from three large internet companies
to provide a perspective on the strategy of the IRA, including
views on the spread and access of IRA-generated content
from January 2017 to August 2017. In addition, this work also
leverages additional data sources including census information.
We describe each data source in turn.
Primary datasets
Facebook ads:OnMay 10, 2018, the House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released (as
PDF documents) 3393 Facebook advertisements reported
by Facebook as paid for by IRA-linked entities3 (Schiff
2018a). We performed optical character recognition (OCR) and
template-based information extraction, and this process yielded
3061 ads with actionable data.
IRA-linked Tweets: Alongside the Facebook ads data, the
House Intelligence Committee also released a dataset on June
8th consisting of 3841 Twitter account handles believed to
be associated with the IRA (Schiff 2018b). Researchers at
Clemson University scraped over 2.9 million tweets from
these handles and performed language and topic classification
(Darren L. Linvill 2018).
3PDF documents for the individual ads included: text associated
with the ad, the ad’s start and end dates, targeting information, and
the URL of the web property that the ad was promoting.
We leverage their work and focus our analysis on English-
language tweets occurring from January 1st to August 1st,
2017 from the following categories they assign: “LeftTrolls”,
“RightTrolls”, “Local” and “News” (See (Darren L. Linvill
2018) for more details). This resulted in a total of 471,000
tweets and 320 handles.
Additionally, many of the tweets link to external domains.
We augment the data by resolving Twitter’s link-shorteners
using historic instrumentation logs from Microsoft web
browsers, described next.
Browsing data: We consider 212 days (January 1 to August
1, 2017) of instrumentation data collected by Microsoft Edge
and Internet Explorer 11 desktop web browsers.4 Data includes
anonymized time-stamped records of page visits. Records are
assembled into sessions of browsing activity: a “session” is
defined as a sequence of page visits such that consecutive visits
are less than 30 minutes apart.
We also used this data to identify upload dates for photos and
videos in Facebook groups. Facebook assigns photos and videos
unique ids visible in the url (i.e. facebook.com/<IRAg
roup>/photos/<id> and facebook.com/<IRAgro
up>/videos/<id>). We group the content by these ids and
recover the earliest dates for each ID that we observe clicks.
This gives us a sense of when the item was posted.
Web search data: Finally, we also analyze the logs of Bing,
a major web search engine. This data reveals which URLs
were presented as search results, even if such pages were not
ultimately clicked by users – something that the browsing
instrumentation data cannot provide. This dataset considers the
same 212 days of data as the browser instrumentation logs.
Joins of primary datasets
We join the primary datasets to recover the scope of the IRA
campaign. We associate IRA Facebook advertisements with
browsing data by identifying clicks from facebook.com
to a URL promoted by an IRA ad 5. An equivalent approach
was followed for joining browsing data with Twitter account
handles and tweets 6.
Search engine logs were joined to the social media data by
matching the URLs of search results to the URLs of pages
actively promoted by Facebook ads and Tweets sent from
IRA-linked twitter accounts. In search logs, we detect both
when links are presented (impressions) and clicked.
Crowdsourced labeling of primary data
We used crowdworkers to label content7 to ascertain infor-
mation about the IRA content’s political leaning, emotional
intensity, and topic. We ran this study for Facebook ads, tweets,
and search results related to IRA-owned web domains.
4Browser data is collected anonymously with user permission.
5After normalizing and reversing URL-transformations that Face-
book applies to URLs (e.g. splicing /pg/ or /?/ fromURLs). Such
events are consistent with users clicking on ads, but are not sufficient to
conclude that a particular ad was clicked because (a) a user may have
arrived at a page from elsewhere in Facebook (e.g. from the newsfeed,
or a notification) and (b) multiple ads promote a common URL.
6We searched for clicks with twitter.com and
<accounthandle> as substrings, thus capturing clicks on
tweets and account handles.
7We use Amazon Mechanical Turk. Workers were paid on average
$12 per hour, above the national minimum wage at the time of
publication.
For Facebook ads, we rated all 1032 ads that ran after
January 1, 2017. For Twitter we rated two subsets: a random
subset of 500 IRA-linked tweets, and the top 500 most clicked
tweets. For Search, we rated the 100 URLs with the most
impressions (these 100 URLs captured 63% of search-result
impressions to URLs in our datasets).
The task showed workers the text content of the promotion:
the original Facebook ad, tweet text, or the snippet text shown
in search results. Based on this information, the workers’ task
was to label the content with the most relevant option in each of
the following categories: 1. Political leaning:{extreme-left, left,
center, right, extreme-right, apolitical, local news}. 2. Emotional
intensity:{neutral, low, medium, high, very high}. 3. Discussed
topic: A predefined topic list.8
Each item was judged by five different crowd workers. We
did quality control by excluding answers from workers with
high disagreement rates (Inel et al. 2014). We performed a
soft-assignment to label each item. For example, if a certain
URL received 2 votes for extreme-right, 1 for left and 2
for extreme-left, then we counted 2/5, 1/5 and 2/5 clicks
in each category respectively. To calculate the number of
clicks on a certain label/topic, we used the soft assignment to
proportionally divide the clicks across the assigned labels.
Secondary datasets
In addition to the primary datasets, we employ numerous exter-
nal secondary datasets. We use Mediabias News and Media Cat-
egories (Zandt 2018) and SimilarWebDomain Categories (Offer
2018), which provide URL-level categorizations, to characterize
the content of URLs in our datasets. We use state-level popular
vote counts for the 2016 presidential election (David Leip 2016),
state-level voter registration data (U.S. Census Bureau 2016),
state-level census demographic data (U.S. Census Bureau 2010),
and state-level protest counts over time (Jeremy Pressman
2018) to characterize browsing data by geography. GDELT
Global-Events data, which captures media publications over
time, is used to characterize external news events (GDELT
2018). Finally, we use OpenSecrets.org (Center for Responsive
Politics 2017) and Ballotpedia (BallotPedia 2017) to identify
major political and donation sites over the period of interest.
III. Structure of the IRA Promotions
Before describing the traffic outcomes of the IRA campaign in
Section IV, we present an overview of the scope and structure
of the campaign to illustrate the breadth of the IRA’s activity
on different platforms.
Facebook Ads
We found that the Facebook advertisements paid for by
the IRA promoted a smaller set of 350 distinct URLs.
These URLs were distributed across 207 web properties.
These properties include Facebook groups and profiles;
Facebook or meetup.com event pages; news websites
(including CNN.com); petitions (whitehouse.gov,
change.org); and four domains identified as controlled
8To extract the topic list we grouped Facebook ad keywords
based on their co-occurrence across advertisements. These were then
manually labeled (e.g. Black Lives Matter, Veterans, see Figure 4e
for a partial list.) See Section IV for more discussion on targeting tags.
Promoted Content # Properties # Ads
Facebook groups 104 2674
Events & meetups 82 223
IRA domains 4 128
News organizations 4 4
Other 16 35
# Total 207 3061
Table 1: Facebook Ad Categories.Web properties promoted
by the IRA Facebook campaign includes Facebook groups,
events and domains suspected to be under the editorial control
of the IRA (Schiff 2018a).
by the IRA (blackmattersus.com, dudeers.com,
black4black.com, donotshoot.us)9 (See Table 1).
The breadth of different content-types is notable (petitions,
events, articles, Facebook groups), and raises questions about
the intent of the IRA campaign. In the next section covering
traffic patterns, we limit our analysis to traffic. However,
we note that the reach of the IRA campaign did go beyond
what can be measured by just traffic. For instance, one of
the IRA’s petitions10 received 65,000 supporters, well within
the range of typical mid-to-high performing change.org
campaigns (according to top popular petitions listed at
https://www.change.org/petitions).
Twitter
The 3, 841 Twitter handles released by (Schiff 2018b) and
2.9 million tweets compiled by (Darren L. Linvill 2018)
were filtered to 471,000 English-language tweets from 320
“LeftTrolls”, “RightTrolls”, “Local” and “News” accounts. Our
analysis of links in these tweets revealed links to over 5,500
domains, tweets, and other properties. Over 95% of tweets are
retweets, or reposting of other users’ tweets, and many of the
tweets point to well-known websites.
We found overlap in naming between the Facebook and
Twitter campaigns: for instance, the Twitter campaign included
a Twitter handle “blackmattersussoldier” and the Facebook cam-
paign included a “BlackMattersUS” Facebook Group. However,
we do not see the Facebook and Twitter campaigns sharing links
or cross-promotions with each other. We observed only four
URLs that were promoted both by Facebook ads and Tweets,
all of them blackmattersus.com URLs with low-traffic.
We could only identify a small number of domains from the
Twitter campaign as IRA-controlled (as compared to the Face-
book campaign), and many of the links promoted by IRA tweets
included major domains such as nytimes.com. As a result
we focus on an analysis of the tweets themselves (for the subset
outlined in Section II), and not the domains they promoted.
Web Search
According to the February 2018 indictment by the Special
Counsel’s office, the IRA was “organized into departments,
9See https://intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/exhibits-
080118.pdf, https://euronews.com/2018/05/10/sean-hannity-black-
lives-matter-among-targets-russian-influence-campaign-n872926,
https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/12/media/dont-shoot-us-russia-
pokemon-go/.
10https://www.change.org/p/barack-obama-u-s-house-of-
representatives-u-s-senate-list-the-ku-klux-klan-as-an-official-
terrorist-organization
including: a graphics department; a data analysis depart-
ment; a search-engine optimization (SEO) department; an
information-technology (IT)...” (Robert S. Mueller 2018). We
find that IRA-promoted web properties were indexed by search
engines, and surfaced to users in response to organic web search
queries. Of the suspected IRA-owned domains we find one
domain in particular, blackmattersus.com, received
significant traffic via Bing (Fig. 6 and Fig. 7). We did not
find evidence of paid advertising on Bing, but more research
is needed for a comprehensive evaluation.
Targeting Decisions
The IRA used 890 different targeting keyword across the
Facebook ads. The most frequent used keywords are all
politically charged or demographically salient, with the top
five being “african american civil rights movement”, “african
american history”, “malcolm x” and “martin luther king jr”.
These five keywords are tagged to 32.3% of ads, which link
to pages capturing 28% of traffic.
We identified pairs of keywords used together with
correlation c>.6, (p<.01), then grouped these pairs together
to identify clusters. We identified 19 such clusters using this
method. When used together the keywords seem to indicate
an attempt at demographic targeting. (We will analyze the
demographic reach of the IRA campaign in Section V).
On Twitter, the most frequently used hashtags (of 44,700 total
unique hashtags) are a combination of political and apolitical
tags, with the top five being: “#MAGA11”, “#NowPlaying”,
“#tcot12”, “#top” and “#PJNET13”. The top ten are tagged to
2.1% of tweets which themselves account for 1.3% of traffic:
hashtags on Twitter were more diverse and did not repeat as
frequently as the Facebook ads keywords.
IV. IRA Content and Traffic
Having described the breadth and size of the IRA’s campaign
in Section III, we now summarize the content of the campaign
and provide an overview of the traffic to it.
Traffic Overview
As noted in the introduction, on average roughly 1 in 40,000
internet users was exposed to IRA ads on any given day in our
dataset.
Perhaps because the platforms’ audiences are different
(Hughs 2012), or because there was little cross-promotion
between the Twitter and Facebook IRA campaigns, we find
very small overlap between users exposed to both campaigns.
Cross-traffic between IRA Facebook properties and IRA tweets
is also small, amounting to about 0.02% of the total users in
our datasets clicking on content from both campaigns in the
same day.
Table 2 shows the most trafficked Facebook groups and
Twitter handles in each campaign, which account for more than
3/4th of total observed traffic in each case. The top-clicked Face-
book groups seem to show a mix of topics and political leanings.
Figures 3a and 3b summarize the common referral pathways
to IRA properties. Traffic to Facebook-advertised URLs
and groups came mainly from Facebook and Search. The
11Make America Great Again
12Top conservatives on Twitter
13Patriot Journalist Network
10 2 10 1
Other
News and Media
Other Social Network
Twitter
Email
Other Search Engine
Google
Bing
Facebook
(a) Referral pathways for clicks
on URLs included in the IRA
Facebook ads.
10 2 10 1
Other
TV and Video
Bing
News and Media
Google
Email
Facebook
Reddit
Twitter
(b) Referral pathways for
clicks on tweets linked to IRA
accounts.
Figure 3:Top traffic channels to IRA properties. Top sources
that brought users to IRA properties (Facebook-advertised
URLs, Facebook groups and Tweets) from January 1, 2017 to
August 1, 2017.
Top-Clicked Facebook Groups Share of IRA Traffic
blacktivists 0.208
godblessthesouth 0.199
blackmattersus.mvmnt 0.169
brownunitedfront 0.116
patriototus 0.077
Other 0.231
Top-Clicked Twitter Handles Share of IRA Traffic
ten gop 0.462
pamela moore13 0.245
crystal1johnson 0.076
southlonestar 0.048
jenn abrams 0.045
Other 0.123
Table 2: Top-performing IRA properties. The top five
Facebook groups (top) and Twitter handles (bottom) with most
traffic. These Facebook groups collectively account for 77%
of traffic to IRA-promoted Facebook properties, while these
Twitter handles account for 88% of traffic.
Twitter campaign drew traffic mainly from Twitter, Reddit and
Facebook, with Search playing a much smaller role.
Traffic by Content-Type
Figure 4 summarizes results from our crowdsourcing study for
both Facebook and Twitter. The left column summarizes the
IRA generated content. The right column describes the traffic
(volume of user cliks) to this content. The figure was created
using the proportional assignment of clicks as described in the
methodology section. The X-axis in all the histograms shows
the distribution of content (ads or tweets) soft-assigned to each
category on the Y-axis.
We see from Fig. 4a that there were more left-leaning
and apolitical ads than right-leaning ads on Facebook. The
Twitter content appears to be more balanced, with most tweets
being apolitical and roughly equal numbers of left-leaning and
right-leaning tweets. When we compare this to the traffic that
was received in each category, we see that right-leaning and
apolitical content got relatively more traffic in our dataset than
left-leaning content on both Facebook and Twitter.
In addition to covering both sides of the political spectrum, the
IRA content spanned a large topic space: Fig. 4e gives the distri-
bution of content (ads, snippets, tweets) across categories, and
Fig. 4f gives the distribution of traffic14. Especially prominent in
14Topic labels were chosen by manual assignment based on clusters
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(a) Distribution of political lean-
ing of IRA Facebook posts and
tweets. We see more left-leaning
and apolitical links than right
leaning links on Facebook. Twit-
ter has roughly equal amounts of
right and left content.
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(b) Distribution of traffic to
different categories of IRA
Facebook posts and tweets, by
political-leaning. Even though
there was more left-leaning
content on Facebook than right-
leaning, the right-leaning content
took a larger share of the traffic.
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(c) Distribution of content across
emotional intensity tags. A large
fraction of the IRA promoted
Facebook and Twitter content was
neural and low emotional intensity.
Especially pronounced is the
Twitter channel, where nearly
43% of content is rated ”Neutral”.
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(d) Distribution of traffic across
the emotional valence of content.
Relative to the proportions of
overall content produced (c),
content with medium and high
emotional valence received more
traffic on Twitter.
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(e) Distribution of IRA content
across topics (Facebook and
Twitter).
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(f) Distribution of traffic to IRA
content across topics (Facebook
and Twitter).
Figure 4: Labels Summary: Content and Traffic. This figure
shows the distribution of the IRA content across political leaning,
emotional intensity and specific politically charged topics using
labels tagged in a crowdsourcing experiment. The assignment
of content to categories was done using the soft-assignment of
crowdsourcing labels as described in the methodology section.
the Facebook campaign were topics targeting African American
and Mexican American interests. The Twitter campaign seems
to have focused on general news, politics and other topics.
among targeting tags in the Facebook ads. The assignment of ad/tweet
to topic was done by crowdsourcing.
V. IRA Strategy
Having summarized the IRA content and traffic to it in Section
III, we now share inferences about IRA’s strategies. We start
with three case studies.
• Case study 1: Rapid-response tweeting to local news devel-
opments helped the IRA receive search engine impressions.
• Case study 2: Apolitical IRA-generated stories appeared
among search results returned for search queries on
Bing.com, including some Microsoft-promoted queries (e.g.,
“women scientists”). Overall, apolitical articles from organic
and Microsoft-promoted queries received more traffic via
the Bing.com search engine than other articles.
• Case study 3: Paid promotions were not the only traffic
driving factor. In fact, we observe that for some of the groups,
there exist other important unpaid actions (e.g. photo and
video shares) that can predict high traffic.
We conclude this section by showing how the IRA reached
various demographically and politically distinct geographic
regions in the country and extensively used Facebook
microtargeting tags.
Case study: Search and twitter.com/TEN_GOP
The IRA tweeted rapidly and in huge volumes across their
accounts, tweeting in some cases thousands of times a day, and
multiple times within seconds. Figure 4 shows that they prin-
cipally tweeted about “News”, “Politics”, and “Entertainment”.
The high volume of rapid tweets allowed them to be unwittingly
incorporated into legitimate news articles at major Western
outlets (For example, an article published by msn.com15 ref-
erences a tweet by @SouthLoneStar, a confirmed IRA account).
In this example, we show that these tweets performed espe-
cially well at drawing unwitting traffic from users discovering
a new news story. The IRA’s TEN GOP16 Twitter handle,
which drew 46% of traffic in the IRA’s Twitter campaign, is
a good case study of how an IRA Twitter account can capture
significant traffic by being indexed by a search engine during
the very early stages of a breaking news cycle.
A news event about Dr. Henry Bello occurred on June 30,
2017. This turned out to be amajor news story in NewYork City,
receiving thousands of news articles of coverage (GDELT 2018).
However, the bulk of these articles were published and indexed
by the search engine on July 1, 2017. Fifteen of the stories
published on July 1st were published by the Associated Press,
however the remainder came from local domains, with the top
domains being: nydailynews.com (12 stories), denik.cz (12
stories), heraldsun.com.au (11 stories) and news-sentinel.com
(10 stories). Because the IRA tweeted about the event around
noon, they got indexed on June 30, beating many of the
articles published and receiving a surge of impressions (i.e. be
displayed as a search result) for the story (see Figure Figure 5).
Case study: blackmattersus.com
We showed earlier that a large volume of apolitical
content was produced by the IRA. We examine the
blackmattersus.com domain as a case study of how this
15https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/uknews/london-attack-
woman-wearing-hijab-was-distressed-horrified-photographer-says/ar-
BByFoiY
16TEN GOP refers to Tennessee GOP. Many IRA accounts
mimicked political accounts (Robert S. Mueller 2018).
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Figure 5: Case study: Tweet impressions for the story of
Henry Bello. Subfigure (a) shows impressions on IRA tweets.
The surge in impressions is likely linked to the early availability
of news information that was unavailable elsewhere; most news
outlets only published stories on this subject the following day
(Subfigure (b)). Subfigure (c) shows the most common search
terms that generated the impressions. Most of the stories were
published by local news outlets.
content content played a role in a larger strategic aim: search
engine traffic followed by an on-site engagement funnel.
Search Traffic blackmattersus.com contained a mix
of content: content that was apolitical and emotionally neutral,
as well as content that was political and emotionally intense (Ta-
ble 3 and Figure 6). We found that content rated as “Apolitical”
drew more traffic on Bing while “Left-leaning” drew more on
Facebook. Additionally traffic to blackmattersus.com
from Facebook was drawn more to pages that were “High” or
“Medium” emotion-level, while traffic from Search centered
on pages that were more likely to be rated “Neutral” or “Low”
emotion.17 We next explore the mechanisms behind this content
performing well through search.
Beyond generating ranked lists of results in response to search
queries input by end users, major search engines also power a
host of company properties like news verticals, homepages and
new-tab pages, which can link out to preformulated queries like,
for example, “women scientists”. Fig. 7 shows that, on several
occasions, blackmattersus.com appeared in the results
17These findings provide support to the speculation voiced by jour-
nalists at (Mak 2018), that the IRAmay have been generating apolitical
content to serve a purpose: to gain Americans’ trust in a network of
seemingly local news handles, which could later be “operationalize[d]
[to] significantly influence the narrative on a breaking news story”.
Top Clicked URLs via facebook.com
/nj-police-officer-arrested-and-charged-f...
/her-provocative-ballet-dance-hurts-white...
/tamron-hall-has-been-replaced-by-megyn-k...
Top Clicked URLs via Search
/black-history-month-black-inventor...
/katherine-johnson-a-black-nasa-pioneer...
/black-female-computer-scientists...
Table 3: Case study: Blackmattersus.com, examples. Top
three most trafficked pages on blackmattersus.com
from either Facebook (top) or Search (bottom).
Share Button Contact Page Meetups Donate
# links 3940 1 896 1
Click rate 2.64% .28% .11% .056%
Table 4: Blackmattersus.com Structure: “Share Button” are
links on each article that encourage sharing on social media, the
“Contact Page” allows users to sign up for email correspondence,
“Meetups” is a listing of localmeetups and “Donate” is a page so-
liciting donations that leads to a paypal.com page. (We saw
no evidence of clicks to paypal.com in the same session.)
returned for such preformulated queries, which were promoted
across several Microsoft properties, including bing.com/n
ews news verticals, new tab pages, and device lock screens.
By publishing neutral, entertaining content the IRA was able
to draw more users to its pages.
0.0 0.2
Distribution of Labels
Neutral
Low
Medium
High
Very High FacebookSearch
(a) Emotion tags given
by crowdsourced workers
to blackmattersus
.com URLs, weighed
by traffic from either
Facebook or search.
0.0 0.5
Distribution of Labels
Extreme Left-Leaning
Left-Leaning
Center-Leaning
Right-Leaning
Extreme Right-Leaning
Apolitical
Local News And Issues
Facebook
Search
(b) Emotion tags given by crowd-
sourced workers to blackmatte
rsus.comURLs, weighed by traf-
fic from either Facebook or search.
Figure 6: Case study: Blackmattersus.com, summary.
Blackmattersus.com was the most highly trafficked
IRA-owned domain in our dataset. The emotional intensity
of pages users reached from Facebook.com is higher than that
for pages reached via search, as can be seen by looking at the
top-trafficked pages on the domain, as well all trafficked pages
as labeled by crowd workers.
Engagement Funnel While gaining a wide reach
through various promotional channels on the internet,
blackmatters.com was structured to potentially engage
users beyond reading articles.
blackmattersus.com is a particularly expansive site
with 4,608 pages: articles, pages linking to Facebook event
pages, a donations page, and an input field soliciting users to
join the site’s mailing list. Shortly upon arrival, a pop-up asks
users if they would like to receive notifications.
We performed a site-wide scrape to categorize pages
hosted on the domain. Table 4 gives our overview of this
domain. On the first row, we show the raw number of links we
counted devoted to each of four action types: “Share Button”,
“Meetups”, “Contact Page”, and “Donate”. Interestingly, the
“Meetups” are pages onsite that link out to meetup.com and
Facebook events, many of which appear to be legitimate events,
and are still active on Facebook. The “Donate” button links to
a paypal.com page18.
Each of these link-types is accessible from any article. The
number of users we see engaging with this funnel is very
low. The second row of Table 4 shows the conversion rate, or
the percentage of users who clicked on one of the links after
clicking on another blackmattersus.com page. These numbers
are only one 1/10th typical conversion rates observed across
e-commerce sites industry-wide (Saleh 2017).
Case study: Did promotions matter?
The IRA’s ad-promotion strategy on Facebook involved
roughly 531 ads and nearly 1million rubles (or $15,000.00) on
left-leaning content, compared with 184 ads and 620 thousand
rubles (or $9,112.00) on right-leaning content. The IRA spent
more on left-leaning content during our observation period.
Clearly, paid advertisements were part of the IRA strategy
to generate traffic to their groups and properties. However, paid
promotions are only part of the story. There are other important
known and unknown factors not to be ignored. Among the
known ones: historical traffic, photo and video shares are the
most correlated ones with traffic spikes.
For example, Fig. 8(a)-(b) illustrates the traffic to different
Facebook groups over time along with (1) photo and video
uploads and (2) paid promotions. For the StopAllInvaders Face-
book group, it seems some traffic spikes co-occur with events
like photo and video uploads, but do not co-occur with paid
promotions. For another example group, BrownUnitedFront,
spikes in traffic seem more aligned with paid promotions than
with media uploads. To isolate the influence of paid promotions
from other unpaid factors, we trained a model with the goal
of predicting the changes in spikes of high-traffic Facebook
groups in the absence of paid promotions.
We used our model to examine six Facebook groups chosen
for having high traffic as well as a large number of promotions.
For these groups, we infer that without paid promotion, the
left-leaning groups would have received fewer traffic spikes,
while traffic spikes for right-leaning groups would have been
largely unchanged. However, an important take away here is
that paid promotions were not the only factor that lead to traffic
spikes, which is something to keep in mind for future work.
A more comprehensive discussion of this is included in
Appendix 2.
Geographic patterns in traffic
87% of the traffic to Facebook-promoted properties was U.S.
based, but we observed clicks to IRA’s properties from 176
countries.
18The paypal.com page is operated by a merchant with the
email address xtimwaltersx@gmail.com, which was one of the emails
mentioned in the Special Counsel’s Indictment (Robert S. Mueller
2018).
Figure 7: Instances of Facebook-Promoted Domains Appearing in Search Results: The domains most associated with the
Facebook-ad campaign often appeared as results to search queries, with surges of search query impressions occurring from time
to time. Some of these spikes can be associated with the promotion of various topics. For instance, the largest spike corresponds
to the page blackmattersus.com/31081-black-female-computer-scientists-how-many-do-you-know
appearing among the results returned for the query, “women scientists” – a query which was briefly promoted on the lock screen
of some Microsoft devices.
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(a) Spikes in unique users per
day (black) sometimes co-occur
with photo and video uploads
throughout the period (green).
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(b) Spikes over time on this
property, in contrast, do not show
any clear relation to photo and
video posts.
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(c) Spikes in unique users per day
(black) show no alignment with
promotions (maroon).
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(d) Spikes in unique users here
show alignment with promotions.
Figure 8: Drivers of Spikes.Many promoted web-properties
(shown above) seem to have click-spikes associated with factors
like paid actions (Facebook-ads) or unpaid actions (photo or
video uploads). The Y-axis in each of the graphs represents the
fraction of total unique users to the group over the time period
that visited on a given day. We quantify the effect of a paid
Facebook promotion on the day of promotion by predicting
spikes the property would have received had it not been
promoted (see Appendix 2). This figure shows that in addition
to paid promotions, unpaid actions (such as photo/video
uploads) also impacted the traffic to the Facebook properties.
We consider a broad array of geographic features to describe
the areas contributing traffic including race-based, rural/urban,
education-based, employment-based and other demographic
features from the 2010 census (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
We look at voting patterns from the 2016 presidential election
(David Leip 2016). We also examine voting as a percentage of
registered voters, a metric that we use to proxy voter enthusiasm
(U.S. Census Bureau 2016).
Fig. 9 shows state-level correlations between census features
and traffic to IRA properties promoted via Facebook. The IRA
properties are clustered by targeting keywords and topics as per
the results of the crowdsourcing study. We only show a subset
of features, and only display correlations with p<.1.
Traffic to IRA content in certain categories is positively cor-
related with demographic features. For example, traffic to IRA
content labeled “Black Lives Matter” is significantly correlated
with the percentage of census respondents self-identifying as
African American in a state (c= .88, p< .001). On the other
hand, this content is negatively correlated with the percentage
of census respondents self-identifying as White in a state.
Moreover, there is a significant negative correlation (c =
−.29,p<.001) between the percentage of of Registered Voters
who Voted (in 2016) in a state with traffic across most ad groups.
Thus, there was more traffic to ads in states with lower voter
turnout. This may support the claim that the IRA operation was
seeking to target areas of voter discontent (Shane and Mazzetti
2018), but is subject to many confounders. Furthermore, it is
important to note that our work is looking at data collected in
2017, two months after the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, and
thus cannot infer anything about the pre-election timeframe.
VI. Effects on exposed users
Having described case studies of the IRA strategy, we now
close with a view of the effects on users. Although our main
conclusion here is that few effects were observed, more research
is needed due to the following limitations. First, this analysis
cannot observe the long-term behavior of internet users online
due to extensive anonymization techniques applied in the data.
Second, browser and query logs give us only a limited view
into users’ online actions (e.g. we cannot see posts, tweets and
emails), and most importantly we cannot observe real-world
blacktivists
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Figure 9: Correlation with state-level census features.
The Facebook-ad campaign was targeted primarily through
interest-tags. We grouped them into clusters by asking crowd
workers to label ad content. The top row shows distributions
over traffic-normalized click counts by state for two sample
groups. The bottom figure shows correlations between census
features and normalized clicks by state (p<0.1 shown).
behaviors. Third, a complete analysis on these effects calls for
data from potentially multiple browsers and search engines to
better cover the online user base, as well as data from a broader
range of mobile devices and applications. For completeness, we
summarize all attempts we made to better understand impact
on exposed users and hope that these attempts will seed further
investigation on the topic.
Our study explored online news consumption, online political
donations, and real-world protests. To categorize online news
consumption, we used data fromMediabiasFactcheck.com to
label domains known for publishing various news-types (Zandt
2018). Using these labels, we examined the browsing behaviors
of users exposed to an IRA ads before versus after exposure to
the ad, while controlling for session length.We did not see signif-
icant changes in the total volume of news consumed, or in the ex-
tremism of news sites visited before and after exposure to the ad.
To understand online political donations, we catalogued the
websites registered for candidates, politicians and major recip-
ients of political donations, using data from OpenSecrets.org
(Center for Responsive Politics 2017) and BallotPedia.org
(BallotPedia 2017). Again, we failed to see any significant
changes in pages visits before and after exposure to an IRA ad.
In addition, we also explored the notion that the IRA was at-
tempting to drawmore people into protests. For example, Robert
S. Mueller’s indictment points to anecdotes of Americans being
driven to attend real-world protests as a result of misinformation
(Robert S. Mueller 2018). Using Crowd Counting Consortium’s
numbers tracking protests in 2017, we examined whether there
was a correlation between where protests occurred in the U.S.
and the locations of ad-clicks by users (Jeremy Pressman 2018).
After normalizing for state-level populations and state-level
browsing behavior, we found no significant correlation.
VII. RelatedWork
Social media and politics. The dataset generated by this paper
was further used in followup work by Boyd, Spangher et al.
(Boyd et al. 2018). This work examined language differences in
the IRA tweets and those posted by a general U.S. population
during the same time. Additionally, Boyd et al., report that
the majority of Facebook ads were posted during 9am and
6pm, Moscow Standard Time. As such, (Boyd et al. 2018)
provides further analysis for the point-of-origin of IRA tweets
and advertisements.
The impact of social media on the political ambit has attracted
significant attention more broadly in both political science and
social media analysis studies. Social networks have facilitated
faster and targeted user communication, which has created new
and amplified effects due to high information diffusion (Bakshy
et al. 2012). From a political perspective, such effects can
often be positive and increase political participation awareness
(Gil de Zu´n˜iga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012). However, as any
powerful means of communication, social platforms can also be
exploited by external entities to produce negative effects in the
society such as drastic political division (Sunstein 2018) as well
as manipulation and misinformation (Marwick and Lewis 2017;
Fourney et al. 2017). This paper specifically focuses on
extracting data-analytic insights that can reveal information
regarding the extreme and potentially divisive characteristics of
the IRA campaign. Being aware of the nature and the scale of
these characteristics is crucial for increasing general awareness
and developing robust protective mechanisms in the future.
Division and polarization. Political division has been
investigated using the notion of “information bubbles”
(Resnick et al. 2013) and “echo chambers” (Bessi 2016;
Garimella et al. 2018). Authors study the phenomenon of
political and intellectual isolation that can occur when users
are only exposed to information that confirms their own beliefs.
While some of these effects can exist due to organic user
behavior, recent research has shown that they have been lever-
aged to increase polarization and division (Stewart, Arif, and
Starbird 2018; Conover et al. 2011; Garimella and Weber 2017;
Bessi 2016). In this context, various tools have been proposed to
foster diverse information consumption either via visualization
(Gillani et al. 2018) or exploration strategies that go beyond
the personal network bubble (Resnick et al. 2013).
Manipulation andmisinformation.Prior research—including
our own—has found social media can be used to to spread
and amplify propaganda at a global scale (Menczer 2016;
Fourney et al. 2017; Silverman 2016). Combined with the fact
that humans are inherently bad at detecting deception (Mihal-
cea, Pe´rez-Rosas, and Burzo 2013; Abouelenien et al. 2014;
Pe´rez-Rosas et al. 2015), decades of algorithmic advances in
targeted advertisement have laid the groundwork for large-scale,
general-purpose mass manipulation.
Manipulation and misinformation strategies transform in-
formation in a form that best propagates ideas or agendas of
specific groups of interest. A comprehensive summary of these
techniques (Marwick and Lewis 2017) shows several examples
where social media has shown to be vulnerable to such attacks
especially from extremist political groups and Internet trolling
entities. In the most harmful form, manipulation can be encoun-
tered as jointly combined with misinformation, where informa-
tion is intentionally twisted or even fabricated. Social media has
been a lucrative target of misinformation (Allcott and Gentzkow
2017; Fourney et al. 2017; Faris et al. 2017) in the recent years.
Social bots on Twitter have played a role in influencing the
spread of information in a network (Varol et al. 2017a; 2017b;
Bessi and Ferrara 2016). Various approaches have been pro-
posed to isolate and limit the harmful effects of misinformation
by harnessing linguistic features, semantic analysis of the con-
tent, and network topology properties (Shu et al. 2017; Budak,
Agrawal, and El Abbadi 2011; Conroy, Rubin, and Chen 2015).
The 2016 US election. The events of the IRA ad campaigns
in the US presidential election in 2016 are not unique. Similar
developments have been noticed in the last five years in the
case of the Brexit referendum in the UK in 2016 (Howard and
Kollanyi 2016), German Federal election in 2017 (Morstatter
et al. 2018), and elections in Pakistan in 2013 (Younus et al.
2014). This work was motivated by the need to better under-
stand the IRA campaign in 2016 and was enabled by the release
of the recent datasets from Facebook and Twitter on this matter
during the respective testimonies at the United States House
of Representatives (Schiff 2018a; 2018b). Guided by the same
motivation, there is recent and ongoing work tackling important
questions related to the structure of the retweet network (Stewart,
Arif, and Starbird 2018) and the characteristics of IRA-promoted
Twitter handles (Darren L. Linvill 2018).Multiple journalistic ef-
forts (Shane 2017;Mak 2018) published illustrative examples of
the promoted content and informed the broader audience. This
paper aims at providing a data-oriented analysis, joining multi-
ple sources of information funneling from the promoted ads and
content, to post-election web traffic, to observable user effects.
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion
While our studies present a set of insights on the strategy,
structure, and scope of IRA-related web activities, our analyses
have limitations. We highlight these as caveats and as guides
for future work in pursuit of confirmation of the results and
inferences shared in this paper. First, much of our analysis relies
on browsing instrumentation data on desktop computers and ex-
cludes mobile devices. The released Facebook ads data set and
the web search data set we use, on the other hand, do include
mobile traffic. Secondly, because the browsing instrumentation
collects only URLs, our browser logs cannot directly observe
interactions that occur within a page (e.g., enabled by AJAX or
JavaScript).We inspectedmany of the web properties and, while
we found that most activities of interest result in changes to the
URL, some (e.g., donations brokered by Facebook) could not
be detected. Also, as with all studies of this nature, we cannot
observe actions taken in the physical world. For example, we
cannot be sure if a person attended a protest that they read about.
Likewise, we restrict our analysis to short-term trends because
our browsing instrumentation data set does not maintain long-
term histories. Our data is also collected in 2017, after the 2016
election, which was one of the targets of the IRA campaign.
Nevertheless, we have demonstrated multiple ways by which
malicious agents can manipulate the digital landscape showcas-
ing the large attack surface susceptible to malevolent interven-
tions. We highlight how Facebook’s fine-grained interest-based
targeting keywords can yield emergent demographic-based
information flow. We show how search platforms, and their
agnostic content-promotion strategies can also be leveraged –
especially when agents are able to get their late-breaking content
indexed before more reputable sources. We hope this work will
further stimulate the development of new approaches to mon-
itoring, understanding, and uncovering propaganda campaigns
as well as technology and policy-based solutions that help
avoid political manipulation. Our findings suggest that cross-
organization collaboration will be valuable in this endeavor.
Circumstances around the 2016 U.S. presidential elections
and rising concerns about the influence of propaganda
campaigns led to the public availability of valuable datasets
for understanding IRA activities. Weaving together the public
datasets with proprietary data on search and browsing activity
provides a previously unavailable lens on the workings of the
IRA campaign. We consider this work a preface to numerous
opportunities ahead and to the many directions that remain to be
explored. We see a dual moving forward, with the Web jointly
holding great promise for strengthening liberal democracies
while also serving as a platform that can be harnessed by
those who seek to manipulate and disrupt. As the digital world
continues evolve, and risks to democracy continue to emerge,
openness and cooperation among major stakeholders will be
essential to understand and counter malevolent threats.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Campaign details
Campaign Structure and Content
In this appendix, we describe the campaign in more detail and
discuss how our observations match with statistics released by
Congress ((Schiff 2018a), (Schiff 2018b)).
In the post accompanying the release of Facebook and Twitter
data by the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence19, Representative Adam Schiff notes:
“The Russians ... weav[ed] together fake accounts, pages,
and communities to push politicized content and videos,
and to mobilize real Americans to sign online petitions
and join rallies and protests.”
We presented evidence of examples of the IRA promoting
protests, meetups, and numerous engagement techniques
with their ads, as discussed above. However, we did not find
evidence of extensive user engagement. On the other hand,
the content that we analyze in our paper contains some gaps
and discrepancies with the content Schiff describes, which we
explore and justify here.
Facebook Rep. Schiff reports identifying the following content
for the IRA’s Facebook campaign (Schiff 2018a):
• 3,519 Facebook ads.
• 470 IRA-created Facebook pages.
• More than 80, 000 pieces of organic content posted to
Facebook accounts.
We observe 3,519 released PDF documents, each describing
a Facebook ad, but as noted in Section II, we were only able
to extract and process usable content from 3,061 of these, i.e.
84% of the posted ads as a result of blank ad-description fields,
missing URL fields, blank documents, and OCR errors.
As noted in Section III, we only find 104 IRA-linked
Facebook groups being promoted by the ads, in contrast to
(Schiff 2018a)’s stated 470 groups. Formal communication and
fact-checking with researchers at Facebook have confirmed that
only 107 of the groups identified were advertised. The missing
3 groups in our data is likely due to OCR errors introduced
when parsing released Facebook-ad PDFs.
We seek to verify the volume of content reported by Rep.
Schiff by deduplicating unique content URLs. We find a total
of 14,860 photo and video posts to IRA-linked accounts, shown
in Figure 10. We were not able to successfully track other post-
types due to the nature of our instrumentation logs, and the
manner by which other content appears on Facebook. It is likely
that out of the 80,000 pieces of content reported by (Schiff
2018a), the over 65,000 pieces that we did not observe included
both: organic posts without photos and videos posted to the 104
IRA-controlled groups included in our study, as well as content
posted to the 366 IRA-controlled Facebook groups not included
in our analysis (as detailed above). Discussions with both Face-
book representatives and Congressman Adam Schiff’s office for
the purposes of fact-checking have confirmed that this interpreta-
tion is reasonable, and there are ongoing efforts to further clarify.
Twitter Schiff reports finding the following content for the
IRA’s Facebook campaign:
• More than 36,000 Russian-linked bot accounts.
19https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/
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(a) Total photos posted by account.
A photo upload is determined by
the minimum timestamp of a click
on it’s unique URL key.
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(b) Total videos posted by account.
A unique video upload is deter-
mined the same way a photo upload
is.
Figure 10: Facebook photos and video uploads: Metrics
capturing the volume of organic (unpaid) posts involving photos
and videos uploaded to IRA Facebook groups.
• 3,841 Twitter accounts affiliated with the IRA.
• More than 130,000 tweets by accounts linked to the IRA.
We had more difficulty verifying Twitter data because of
ambiguity between the definitions of “Russian-linked bot
accounts” and “accounts affiliated or linked to the IRA”.
Further the number 130, 000 was smaller than what was
observed by other researchers (Darren L. Linvill 2018). We
attempted to fact-check with Representative Schiff’s office and
representatives from Twitter to resolve these queries but were
unable to come to a resolution. In this paper, we therefore rely
on data provided by (Darren L. Linvill 2018), which aggregates
historical tweets produced over time by the aforementioned
IRA affiliated or linked accounts.
After excluding non-English tweets and restricting to the
categories as described in the methodology section, we were
left with 1, 746, 000 tweets from 917 accounts believed to
be IRA-affiliated. Further restricting to our time-period of
observation, we are left with 471,000 from 360 accounts.
Campaign Size and Discussion
In this discussion section, we seek to give a comparative
analysis of the size of the IRA’s operation in terms of staff,
budget and content output. In his indictment of the IRA (Robert
S. Mueller 2018), Special Counsel Robert Mueller states:
The ORGANIZATION [the IRA] employed hundreds of
individuals for its online operations, ranging from creators
of fictitious personas to technical and administrative
support. The ORGANIZATION’s annual budget totaled
the equivalent of millions of U.S. dollars.
As a rough comparison, the New York Times newsroom,
according to public information, employs about 1,300
journalists, writers, copy-editors, social media producers and
others (Pompeo 2014). According to the Times’ 10-K report,
its operating cost in 2017 was 1.48 billion USD (S.E.C. 2017).
The Times uploads between 200-300 articles, blogs, and
interactives a day (Spangher 2015). From public browsing, it
appears the Times tweets from 5-10 accounts, about 50-100
times a day. They post on Facebook from 5-10 accounts,
posting 50-100 times a day as well.
TheWashington Post likewise has a newsroom of more than
700 staff. According to public statements, they produce an
average of 500 pieces of content a day (videos, photos, articles
and interactive pieces). The last available public data for the
Post shows operating costs in the range of 1.8 billion USD, in
201220(S.E.C. 2012). According to a brief survey of their social
media accounts, they too produce between 50-100 posts on
their Facebook accounts and 50-100 tweets from their Twitter
accounts a day.
Buzzfeed, according to public reporting, has a newsroom of
around 460 staff. They produced roughly 200 articles a day in
2016 (Meyer 2016). A brief survey on social media reveals that
BuzzFeed posts to Facebook between 100-200 times a day and
tweets roughly the same amount.21
Based on material revealed from congressional testimony,
the IRA generated over 2.9 million tweets from over 2,800
active accounts22. During our observation period, they tweeted
at least, on average, 2,000 times a day. They fielded 3,519
Facebook ads, roughly 5 ads a day during our period of interest.
According to Facebook photo/video URL scraping, discussed
earlier, they additionally produced at least 14,285 photos and
575 videos over the period of interest, or roughly 70 photos and
3 videos a day (Figure 12).
This does not include content on their owned domains.
The domains we have examined show abundant material
being produced. We find blackmattersus.com to be
particularly expansive. By performing a site-wide scrape, we
find over 3,900 articles published, and roughly 5 per day during
our observation period. They logged more than 3 new meetup
links a day during our observation period.
An apples-to-apples comparison based on raw volume of
output is doubtlessly flawed, since we can not compare the
production time each piece of content requires at the Times, the
Post or BuzzFeed with the time required for content produced
by the IRA. Much of the IRA’s content is likely derivative or
simply copied: many articles on blackmattersus.com
appear duplicative, and 95% of the tweets recorded from
accounts of interest are retweets. (Less than 1% of tweets
from major news organizations are retweets). However, even
with very conservative estimates, assuming their staff spent
fractions of the time per piece of content as BuzzFeed, we add to
Mueller’s estimate (Robert S. Mueller 2018) to project that just
their content-focused staff still numbered in the low hundreds.
Their budget in the “millions of USD” (Robert S. Mueller
2018) means they spent far capital per piece of content than
the Times or the Post, but we emphasize that nevertheless, this
was an effort that approached the scope of a large newsroom.
An important question is whether the IRA campaign was
worthwhile. As presented in Table 5 and Figure 11, the cam-
paign and the agency received a significant volume of coverage
from Western mainstream outlets at hundreds of articles per
outlet and thousands of articles a day. These facts speak to the
scale of such campaigns and the role that journalists and scien-
tists – present authors included – should play in these ongoing
attempts to manipulate the online information landscape.
Appendix 2: Effect of paid promotions
As noted in the paper, the IRA spent moremoney on left-leaning
content than on right-leaning content on Facebook during our
20The Post was bought in 2013 by Jeffrey Preston Bezos, and is
now held by a privately owned company, Nash Holdings LLC. (Irwin
and Mui 2013)
21BuzzFeed has always been a privately held, and does not disclose
costs (Bloomberg 2018).
22Of the 3841 Twitter handles in the dataset, 1034 handles posted
no content during the period of observation (Darren L. Linvill 2018).
Media Outlet Mentioning IRA Count of articles
yahoo.com 830
iheart.com 550
nbcnews.com 306
msn.com 256
washingtonpost.com 210
reuters.com 210
enterprise-security-today.com 168
dailymail.co.uk 153
Table 5: IRA mentions in Western media, top outlets. Top
outlets publishing articles mentioning “Russian Troll”, “IRA”,
“internet-research-agency”, “blacktivist”, “black-matters-us” in
URLs (calculated using (GDELT 2018)).
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Figure 11: IRA mentions in Western media, over time.
Number of articles in western media mentioning “Russian
Troll”, “IRA”, “internet-research-agency”, “blacktivist”,
“black-matters-us” in URLs(calculated using (GDELT 2018)).
Feature type (X) Feature name
historical click volume (7-day window excluding
the last 2 days)
unpaid action #posted photos
#posted videos
contextual #clicks on external similar urls
#search queries on similar topics
content topics present in the url (binary)
Table 6: Feature types used in counterfactual modeling.
observation period. Furthermore, traffic spikes to IRA Facebook
groups were also influenced by events such as photo and video
uploads in addition to paid promotions. To understand if paid
promotions mattered more for some groups than for other
groups, we asked: Would these groups still have had high traffic
spikes had they not been advertised on Facebook?
We are limited in our ability to answer this question given
that we cannot conduct a controlled study of traffic with and
without paid promotions. Hence we decided to build a simple
model to predict traffic to a group in the absence of a paid
promotion, and use this as a comparison baseline.
We trained a model with the goal of predicting how each
Facebook group would have performed had it not been pro-
moted using a paid ad. For this purpose we trained the model
to predict the probability of a spike (a spike only using (group
url,date) tuples for which the url was not promoted on the
given date and we omitted the promotion treatment from the
input feature set. We then evaluate the predicted performance
on days that articles did receive promotions and compared our
predictions.
We note that our causal analysis here is restricted. The
question we ask is “Would these groups still have had high
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(d) Videos posted on Facebook
over time to IRA accounts.
Figure 12: Metrics capturing the volume of unpaid photos and videos uploaded to IRA Facebook groups.
Facebook Group (a) AUC no prom. (b) AUC prom.
blacktivists 0.965 0.698
patriototus 0.876 0.703
brownunitedfront 0.961 0.792
williamsandkalvin 0.808 0.771
secured.borders 0.792 0.760
stopallinvaders 0.712 0.724
Table 7: Area under ROC curve (AUC) of prediction models
tested on time-window holdout data on days (a) without
promotions or (b) with promotions, ordered by the difference
between the two columns.
traffic spikes had they not been advertised on Facebook?”
This is different from the question: “What is the impact of a
promotion?”. In fact, the question we ask is closer to: “When
did the promotions not matter for traffic spikes?”
Data and Methodology. For this case study, we consider a
specific set of Facebook groups that received both large amounts
of traffic and many promotions during the train and test periods.
These constraints yield six groups23. We limit our study to these
groups since it is difficult to make any statements on the effect
of promotions for groups that did not receive many promotions.
We formatted our dataset as (group url,date) pairs.
We trained separate `2-constrained Logistic Regression models
for each group on all (group url,date) pairs with no pro-
motions to predict the likelihood of a traffic spike to that group
on the given date. Here, a “spike” is defined as click-counts
larger than the 50th percentile of all daily click-counts for the
Facebook group being modeled. We train only on dates without
promotions, to predict the counterfactual traffic outcome on
dates with promotions. Our training data came from 1/1 to 5/1
and our test data was that collected from 5/2 to 8/1.
Table 6 summarizes all features used for these models.
Unpaid action features count the number of photos and videos
posted by each group on the given date. Content features
are binary indicators marking topic-relevance based on our
crowdsourcing task.Contextual features track traffic to non-IRA
news websites properties and volumes of search queries that
were topically relevant to any of the topics of any of the groups
being studied. These features capture the possible influence of
external news factors.
Additionally, instead of using traffic immediately preceding
each date to calculate historical features, a buffer of 2 days is
23These 6 groups together account for 64% of traffic and 36% of
ads ran (15% of ad spend) over the observation period.
Figure 13: Effect of Promotions. The average log lift of click
percentile for each group on days with a paid promotion,
compared the probability we predict a spike would have
occurred without promotion. Positive values indicate higher
importance of promotions with respect to traffic spikes.
used. We purposely exclude a feature indicating whether the
property had been promoted during the given day. And we took
steps to ensure that no other model features would leak this in-
formation (e.g. the click volume feature only counts clicks up to
two days before the spike date). We experimented with adding
a feature counting past-promotions, but found little change.
We interrogated the independence relationships in our ob-
served data to test whether our assumptions hold. We test for
conditional independence between treatment and all other vari-
ables, given outcome (using corr(xi,xj|y)=0 for all values of
y∈{0,1}, and for all xi, xj pairs). We observe independence
between all treatment and outcome variables (correlation>
.1,p<.1). (We apply significance testing with Bonferroni cor-
rections to critique our faithfulness assumption.)24
These independence observations give us confidence that
our assumptions are being met.
The modeling decisions we made improve the adherence of
our data to the causal structure we infer.
1. Treatment assignment: We do not find strong evidence for
a dependence relationship between treatment assignment and
outcome, mediated through confounding factors. Based on
a Causal Markov assumption, this implies that we can safely
model using these features as independent (Scheines 1997).
2. Historical treatments: We also did not find significant
relationships between historical promotions and current
24Note: we continued to see correlations between individual features
inX, but according to theCausal Markov assumption, this does not im-
pact our causal claims regarding the promotion’s effect on the outcome.
promotions, strengthening our belief that independence
across different dates and urls is maintained.
Additionally, we took steps to limit overfitting. As mentioned
above, we model each Facebook Group separately. We tuned
each model’s `2 hyperparameter using holdout validation data
during training. We also iterated to include external news
and traffic features. We choose to measure the Area Under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) as a
performance measure in order to handle class imbalance and
also avoid picking a probability decision threshold for when
a prediction should be leaning towards a spike.
Findings. The most important features across our models, in
terms of average coefficient values across all models, were
historical clicks, # posted photos, # posted videos. This suggests
a role for unpaid actions in the IRA strategy.
Table 7 shows the AUCs for each group calculated for days
with more than one promotion running (promo. column) or
with no running promotion (no prom. column) in the test period.
Again, since the models were trained only on no prom. days in
the training period, the no prom. column is a validation test to
empirically check how well the model generalizes to previously
unseen data with no promotions, while the prom. column tests
our counterfactual extrapolation.
For groups with a prom. AUC closer to a no-prom. AUC
(e.g. “StopAllInvaders”), promotional signal is not necessary
for the model to predict a spike: i.e., a variable capturing
promotion-information would not have added signal and other
factors, encoded in the model features, had a higher impact. For
cases where the AUC score is divergent (e.g. “Blacktivists”),
model-features were not sufficient, meaning that other factors
unknown to this model, including promotions, played a
significant role. Again, the reason why we look at the difference
between these two columns and not only at the absolute value
of each, is to decouple the ability of the model to generalize
to unseen no promotion data from the ability of the model to
extrapolate traffic spike predictions on dates with promotions.
Figure 8 shows another view of these results. In Figure 8,
we consider only the days with promotions, and compare the
observed traffic patterns (showing prom. traffic) with our model
predictions (modeling no prom., or the counterfactual). We
calculate the logarithmic ratio between the observed traffic (in
percentile) and the predicted probability of a spike on that date,
as assigned by the model.
